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Catering and Dividend Policy: 
Evidence from the Netherlands over the Twentieth Century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the 20th century. 
We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 
1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first 
episode, prior to the Second World War, was characterized by dividends that were fixed 
contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined 
by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterized by 
dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of 
shareholder’s preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in 
dividends with a lag.  Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by 
shareholder wealth maximization, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, 
dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.  
 
 3 
 
1. Introduction 
After the seminal works of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) and Black (1976), the most 
commonly cited arguments in favour of firm’s paying dividends are the reduction in agency 
costs (Easterbrook 1984; and Jensen 1986) and the value of signalling (Bhattacharya 1979; and 
John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). For recent years, Fama and French (2001) 
show that the proportion of firms paying cash dividends has sharply declined. Moreover, Brav 
et al. (2005) show that recently US firms exhibited significant decoupling between earnings 
and dividends. Recently, the changing preferences of shareholders have been incorporated in 
the literature by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), who show that firms’ dividend policies 
during the period 1963-2000 catered towards shareholders’ appetite, based on relative market 
valuations of (non-) dividend-paying stocks. Dividend policy has also been studied in an 
historical context. Dividend policy for British firms has been studied by Turner et al. (2013) 
over the period 1825-1870, while Braggion and Moore (2011) investigate British firms, over 
the period 1895-1905. Long-run evidence on dividend policies of Belgian firms over 1838-
2012 has been provided by Moortgat et al. (2017).  
This study investigates determinants of dividend policies for Dutch companies. We ask 
two questions. First, how did dividend policies evolve in The Netherlands over the course of 
the 20th century? Second, how did the purpose of Dutch dividend policies change in this 
evolution? We describe the history of Dutch corporate finance and governance and examine 
the role of shareholder preferences in firm’s payout policies. We identify three distinct regimes 
of dividend policies in Dutch economic history and estimate models for each regime to assess 
the determinants of dividend policy and value effects of dividends. We apply data on Dutch 
non-financial corporations listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam from 1903 to 2003. 
Studying Dutch dividend policy over an extended period is interesting for a variety of reasons. 
First, the Dutch economy is a small and open economy and a price taker on global markets, as 
such dividend policies should resonate with international practices. Second, the quality and the 
availability of the data is good. While Turner et al. (2013) and Braggion and Moore (2011) 
study respectively fifty and ten years, we study a period covering one hundred years. Moortgat 
et al. (2007) cover a period of 174 years, but their analysis is primarily based on stock market 
data and does not use accounting data. 
The main contribution of our paper is to relate catering theory to the understanding of 
long-run dividend policy evolution. Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) document that firms 
adjust their dividend payouts to short-term changes in the relative valuation of firms that do 
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and do not pay dividends. In addition to this short-term catering practice, we document a more 
fundamental way of catering where firms adapt to long-term changes in shareholders’ 
preferences about the dividend policies. We show that over time there is substantial time 
variation in dividend policies, which is consistent with managers of large firms who cater 
towards shifts in shareholder preferences.  
The remainder of this study is structured in the following manner. First, in Section 2, 
we describe the institutional background of the Dutch corporate sector in order to document 
the three distinct dividend policy regimes and we define predictions for each of the three 
regimes. Section 3 introduces the data set and methods. In section 4 we describe our empirical 
analyses of the determinants of dividends of the payout ratio, as well as the value-implications 
of dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Dividend regimes  
 
2.1 Early 20th century: Distributing profits according to statutes 
Characterized by a tradition of international trade and foreign investment, the Netherlands’ 
small, open economy experienced a long period of economic growth and international 
interconnectedness that lasted until 1914 (Sluyterman 2005). Neutrality during the First World 
War posed both challenges and opportunities for Dutch firms, but the economy largely 
benefited and grew strongly after 1918 (Van Zanden 1998). Although some larger 
multinational firms were located in the Netherlands, the majority of public firms were relatively 
small, with dominantly family ownership and private investors (Westerhuis and De Jong, 
2015). Notwithstanding a revision in 1928, the law governing financial reporting incorporated 
in the Commercial Code remained underdeveloped until enactment of the Company Law in 
1976. Prior to the Second World War, firms seldom disclosed more financial information than 
was required by law, and also held undisclosed reserves (Zeff et al. 1992). 
 The main purpose of dividends in the early 20th century was twofold. First, dividends 
were a source of income for the shareholders. Many families and private investors would use 
the dividends for consumption and the remainder for reinvestment in other assets. Second, due 
to weak disclosure practices, dividends provided the most tangible evidence of the firms’ 
performance. The practice of determining the annual dividend also reflects this dual purpose, 
as the dividend policy was predetermined in the company statutes, contracting the management 
to distribute cash to the owners (Koert 1934). A typical statutory arrangement would distribute 
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profits between reserves, to which an amount sufficient to meet a specified level would be 
allocated, and fixed payments, expressed as a percentage of their nominal equity value, made 
to shareholders (and directors). These practices originated in the 18th century (Koert 1934). The 
remainder, defined as excess profits, was used to further augment reserves and dividends paid 
to shareholders and directors. Profits were thus a key determinant of dividend payout. Owing 
to the requirement to maintain reserves, however, profits did not necessarily correlate perfectly 
with payout ratio. A firm that reported a loss typically did not pay a dividend. A positive effect 
might be observed in case the accumulated reserves are deemed sufficient, leaving a greater 
portion of profits to be distributed as dividends. Clearly, firms distributed a large part of the 
profits to their owners, thereby informing investors about the firm’s value.1 Dividends were 
consequently perceived by shareholders to convey important information about firms’ earnings 
and financial prospects.2 
Koert notes that since the start of the 20th century final decisions about profit 
distribution have been made at shareholder meetings (Koert 1934, p. 122), in practice, 
determined by the largest shareholders while dispersed and unorganized minority shareholders, 
typically more interested in short-term capital gains than in policies designed to strengthen 
firms or foster long-term growth, rarely attended such meetings. Koert concludes that the 
structure of dividends changed little between 1900 and 1930. In practice, liquid assets also had 
relevance as sources of cash for dividend payments. Financial markets and external financing 
were of limited importance during this period, firms relying largely on retained earnings to 
finance investment.3 Cash was the prevailing type of dividend until the Second World War, 
while share repurchases and stock dividends played only on a minor role to that point (Van 
Keep 1950, p. 87).4  
Although taxation of dividends varied over this period (Brandsma 1995), dividends 
were punished with a small taxation and capital gains were exempt. In 1892, the Patentregt, 
dating from 1805, was split into the Wealth Tax Act (Wet op Vermogensbelasting 1892), with 
                                            
1 International practice did not differ much from Dutch practice in terms of relevance of dividends to investors 
and high payouts; Acheson et al. (2009) document dividends to have been the most important component of 
shareholder returns in the 19th century United Kingdom.  
2 The taxation of dividend and bonus payouts from 1917 onwards was motivated by difficulty in measuring profits. 
This situation was not uncommon, for example Rutterford (2004) describes that before the 1948 Companies Act 
and 1965 taxation revision British investors were required to adhere to dividend-based valuation techniques owing 
to the low credibility of British earnings figures.  
3 Polak (1923) mentions dividends as financial policy only on p. 169, in reference to retained earnings serving to 
repay debt, in effect, a negative leveraging of dividends (based on De Jongh 1919). 
4 Dorsman (1981, p. 8) notes that in the Netherlands the first stock dividend was paid in 1930 by Rubber Cultuur 
Maatschappij Amsterdam, and that many Dutch firms resorted to stock dividends during the Second World War 
owing to the difficulty of transferring cash (see also Van Keep 1950, Appendix pp. 153-155). 
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an initial fictional income tax of 4% (levied on wealth in excess of 13,000 guilders at a 
maximum rate of 0.15% of the 4%), and Operating Tax Act (Wet op Bedrijfsbelasting 1893), 
which taxed dividend income at 2%. This tax regime provided a minor disadvantage of 
dividends, as well as a double taxation for shareholders based on both fictional and actual 
dividend income (Brandsma 1995). In 1914 the Income Tax Act (Wet op de Inkomstenbelasting 
1914) replaced the 1892/3 acts and taxed wealth directly without fictional income. This law 
was complemented by a new dividend tax for corporations introduced in 1917 (Wet op de 
Dividend en Tantièmebelasting), which taxed dividend and bonus payouts moderately at 5% 
(1917) to 12% (1940), and lasted until 1940 (Brandsma 1995). Even though the tax on 
dividends switched from shareholders to corporations, in the entire period dividends receive an 
unfavourable tax treatment when compared to untaxed capital gains. However, this tax was 
relatively low.   
In Table 1 we present predictions for the dividend patterns and payout policies in the 
first period, and for the two subsequent regimes. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
We expect in the period 1903-1938, labelled as the ‘statutory formula’ period, that firms pay 
dividends when the profits allow them to do this. This implies that dividends are cyclical, i.e. 
in times of sufficient profitability, most firms will pay dividends and distribute a high portion 
of the profits. Due to this cyclicality, the dividends will fluctuate with the business cycle. Firms 
reporting losses will not pay dividends, and the level of profitability affects dividends 
positively. Reserves are not used to pay dividends, while sufficient liquidity does have a 
positive effect on the probability of paying dividends, mainly for practical reasons. Because 
taxes are negligible we expect no effect from taxation on dividends. For shareholders, the 
dividends are a key source of information, and therefore firm values are strongly driven by 
dividend payments and the level of the dividends.   
 
2.2 Post-war developments: Smoothing dividends 
The Dutch economy experienced a period of stagnation from 1929 until the Second World War 
(Van Zanden 1998, p. 106), although the Dutch economy recovered somewhat after leaving 
the Gold Standard in 1936. In the 1930s, the profits of the firms dropped markedly and many 
firms reported losses. This implied that many firms ceased to pay dividends or had to cut 
dividends dramatically. Shareholders became aware that the policy of paying out a fraction of 
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earnings negatively affected their income and thus consumption. After the Second World War, 
the Netherlands witnessed a period of strong growth (1945-1973). In this period, the 
shareholder base of Dutch listed firms did not change, even though the rights of shareholders 
were gradually limited, because supervisory boards and employees became more powerful 
(Westerhuis and De Jong 2015).   
Dividend policy in the post-war years was largely determined by experiences in the 
1930s, shareholders worldwide demanding dividends that could not be paid in the face of 
declining profits. This experience prompted a revision of ideas about dividend policy. US 
scholars and practitioners were the first to promote the notion of smoothing. Wilbur (1932) 
mentions that in the “generally depressed conditions […] companies have been forced to revise 
established dividend policies” (p. 373). He then argues that firms can benefit from stabilizing 
dividends, by reducing dividends in times of high profits to be paid out in poor conditions, 
smoothing the dividends. The benefits is that this “[…] creates a loyal group of shareholders.” 
(p. 377). Around the globe smoothing, a new dividend policy, was introduced: in the US by 
scholars such as Wilbur (1932) and Buchanan (1938) and in similar spirit in the Netherlands 
by Van Berkum (1943). Under this regime firms pay stable dividends, where changes in 
earnings are gradually incorporated in dividends. 
In this regime, firms tend to hesitate to increase dividends in the wake of increases in 
profits that may not be sustainable; dividends are smoothed when adjustments in response to 
changes in earnings occur with a delay (Lintner 1956).5 The notion of smoothing was 
articulated in the Netherlands initially by Van Berkum (first in 1943 and again in 1948). 
Smoothing policies, clearly described in seminal work by Van Keep (1950), soon became the 
dominant recommended policy in Dutch academic writings (De Lange 1957; Meij and Snel 
1964; and Bouma 1980). Firms in a smoothing regime build reserves by retaining profits, 
rendering dividends more predictable and less dependent on short-term changes in earnings, 
and forestalling discontinuation in the event losses are incurred. Van Keep (1950) justified 
smoothing on the basis of such positive effects as rendering shareholders more loyal and less 
speculative and enhancing firms’ creditworthiness and liquidity. Dividend policy was, during 
                                            
5 Lintner (1956) has conducted interviews with corporate executives and empirically tested a smoothing model 
derived from the interviews. His model is motivated as follows (page 101): “A prudent foresighted management 
will always do its best to plan ahead in all aspects of financial policy to avoid getting into such uncomfortable 
situations where dividends have to be cut substantially below those which the company's previous practice would 
lead stockholders to expect on the basis of current earnings. Stockholder reactions in such situations have been 
sufficiently vigorous and effective in enough companies that the fear of such a reaction is an effective "burr under 
the saddle" to all managements, including those which have never been in such difficulty themselves”. 
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this period, even referred to as reservation policy (reserveringspolitiek).6  
Dividends were taxed and constrained in a variety of ways during this period (Brandsma 
1995). A 1941 resolution (Besluit op de Dividendbeperking 1941) imposed a tax on 
corporations that paid out more than 6% on paid-in capital. This resolution replaced in 1950 by 
a dividend limitation (Besluit op de Dividendbeperking 1950) that remained in place until 1953. 
In 1953, the Dutch Social-Economic Council concluded that the limitations were not effective 
in influencing dividend payouts (SER 1953). The Dutch government responded to the oil crisis 
in 1974 by capping dividends at the maximum of the percentage of the previous year or average 
over the past five years (Machtigingswet Inkomensvorming 1974).7 Dividends were taxed as 
income of the shareholders, while capital gains remained untaxed. The Wet op 
Dividendbelasting, introduced in 1965 and revised in 1969, increased the withholding tax from 
15% to the internationally customary 25%. The dividend taxes were first withheld as 15% of 
the payout by the corporations and later settled with other sources of income. When compared 
to capital gains, dividends were taxed at the marginal tax of private investors, while for 
corporations owning shares this disadvantage of dividends did not exist.  
The quality of financial reporting improved with the enactment, in 1971, of the Law on 
external financial reporting (Wet op de Jaarrekening van Ondernemingen). In an effort to 
smooth reported profits as well as dividends, firms were also managing their earnings 
(Hoogendoorn 1985).  
The second regime in 1948-1983 is labelled ‘smoothing’ and we predict that firms aim 
to pay a dividend every year and keep the level constant. As summarized in Table 1, we expect 
a high probability that firms pay a dividend, and that the dividends will be more stable. As a 
result, firms will be conservative in paying more dividends when profits rise, and rather add 
profits to the reserves. Therefore, dividends will be lower. Dividends are also reduced due to 
various constraints and the negative tax treatment. When firms report a loss the chances of 
paying dividends are reduced. Compared to the previous regime, profits will be less important, 
due to the smoothing, while reserves now become a key driver of dividends.  Firms were 
building reserves with the explicit label to pay dividends in times of insufficient profits. 
Consistent with dividends as evidence of long-term value, in this episode firms paying a 
dividend still sell at a significant premium. Annual dividends are not related the earnings of 
                                            
6 Although some firms paid stock dividends, cash remained the dominant form of dividend throughout these 
periods. In the 1970s, some Dutch (initially only financial) firms began to offer investors a choice between cash 
and stock dividends (Dorsman 1981; Klaassen 1987; and Van den Burg 1990); such so-called choice dividends 
subsequently began to be offered by other types of firms. 
7 The law was automatically suspended on January 1st 1975. 
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that year, but the long-term developments of dividends will inform investors about the 
management perspective on firm value.  
 
2.3 International developments: shareholder value and dividends  
Since the 1980s, Dutch firms have been increasingly influenced by international developments. 
Foreign investors increased their holdings in Dutch firms, and Dutch firms expanded 
internationally. Following the recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Dutch economy 
grew hand-in-hand with the world economy, exerting pressure on collaborative structures 
evolved in the 1960s and 1970s that married capital and labour (De Jong et al. 2010). The influx 
of foreign shareholders and the ideology of shareholder value maximization imported from 
Anglo-Saxon countries during this period focused attention on dividend policies that could help 
firms maximize stock prices by minimizing agency and information costs. 
It is instructive to briefly sketch academic developments in dividend policies in the 
United States. Miller and Modigliani argued in 1961 that dividend policy is irrelevant to firm 
value under stringent efficient-market assumptions. Later theorists argued that dividends are 
relevant to shareholder value, giving rise to the theoretical notions of moral hazard agency and 
adverse selection signalling. The moral hazard agency argument (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Grossman and Hart 1980; Easterbrook 1984; and Jensen 1986) holds that managers are inclined 
to act out of self-interest at the expense of shareholders, and that the agency costs of this 
behaviour can be reduced via dividends, that is, firms should pay out, to prevent managers from 
wasting, excess cash flows. Managers cash constrained after dividend payouts are consequently 
forced to approach the capital market for additional funding, a disciplining role that results in 
free cash flow having a positive effect on dividends as firms return high earnings to the 
financial markets. Concurrently, alternative disciplinary devices reduce the need for dividends, 
such as leverage, ownership and board structures. Signalling theory maintains that firms can 
convey to financial markets valuable signals about future prospects (Spence 1974; 
Bhattacharya 1979; and Miller and Rock 1985). The dividend decision being related to 
information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders, the (in)tangibility of 
assets relates to information asymmetry, tangible assets being easier to value objectively. 
Interestingly, the emphasis of signalling theory is not on the level of dividend vis-à-vis profits, 
but on the decision whether to pay a dividend.  
Anglo-Saxon theories promulgated by financial economists strongly influenced 
Dutch executives as well as academics’ research and teaching, Duffhues (1997), for example, 
discussing in several chapters of his widely used textbook modern dividend theories absent 
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from the previous generation of textbooks such as Bouma (1980). In the Netherlands from the 
1980s onwards, dividend policies, among others, served to reduce principal-agent costs. In 
addition, firms aimed to signal the value of their companies by paying out dividends.8  
While shareholders were satisfied with the smoothed dividends in the 1950s until the 
1970s, in the 1980s the shareholder base of Dutch firms started to change markedly, bringing 
new preferences for firm dividend policies. In the 1980s Dutch institutional investors changed 
their portfolios to include more stock holdings, compared to their traditional focus on 
government debt. In addition to the Dutch pension funds, mutual funds, banks and insurance 
companies, also international institutional investors entered the Dutch market. De Jong, Röell 
and Westerhuis (2010) describe this transition and show that from hardly any international 
ownership in the early 1980s, foreign institutional investors owned 37% and 75% of large 
Dutch firms in 1995 and 2005, respectively. For these investors, dividends are costly, as they 
incur transaction costs to reinvest dividends to maintain their positions. Moreover, the investors 
are mainly oriented at shareholder value creation, not at the cash flows from their investments. 
The disclosure quality of financial reports had improved from the 1970s onwards. With the 
international investors, Anglo-Saxon ideas about shareholder value creation became prevalent, 
in particular ideas about agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Grossman and Hart 1980; 
Easterbrook 1984; and Jensen 1986) and signalling (Spence 1974; Bhattacharya 1979; and 
Miller and Rock 1985). These ideas were adopted by Dutch investors and managers (Duffhues 
1997). 
In Table 1 we describe our predictions for the third regime, ‘agency and signalling’. 
We predict that dividend policy is characterized by high propensity to pay dividends (a positive 
signal and reducing agency costs), low dividend payouts and low variation in dividend 
payments, because of the low levels of dividends. We expect that dividends become symbolic 
in nature and that earnings and dividends are decoupled as Anglo-Saxon ideas propagated its 
way through the Dutch economy. Firms reporting losses are less likely to pay a dividend, but 
profits are no longer key determinants. There will still be a minor role for reserves and liquidity 
to maintain the dividends. We expect a limited positive effect of paying a dividend, while the 
level has no value-relevance. 
 
                                            
8 Share repurchases remained relatively uncommon in the Netherlands mainly for fiscal reasons, revenues from 
repurchased shares being treated as dividend income until 2001, when the re-introduction of a new system that 
taxes a fictional return on wealth eliminated the disadvantage of dividends from a personal tax perspective. 
Empirical studies of share repurchases show the minor importance of this means of distributing profits (Herst and 
Rebers 1996; Baltus and Schouten 2000; and Roosenboom et al. 2001). 
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3. Data, variables and methodology 
 
3.1 Data sources 
Our sample is composed of Dutch non-financial corporations listed on the stock exchange of 
Amsterdam from 1903 to 2003. Collecting firm data for one year per five-year period excluding 
the Second World War yields twenty cross-sections with five-year intervals. Financial and non-
financial data were procured from the following sources. The Gids bij de Prijscourant contains 
share and dividend information for all securities listed on the Amsterdam exchange. The Van 
Oss Effectenboek, a contemporary investor manual published annually from 1903 until 1978, 
include balance sheets, profit and loss statements, share information, directors’ names, and 
information on distribution of profits. The Tabellen der Laagste en Hoogste Koersen provides 
information on stock prices and dividends. For the period 1977 to 2003, we consulted a 
database of exchange-listed firms of the Centraal Bureau Statistiek. Our sample, limited by the 
inclusion only of firms for which complete information is available for the variables in our 
analyses for a given year, firms during the early part of the 20th century disclosing on a 
voluntary basis, and some providing only limited, financial data, includes 3,638 firm-year 
observations for 704 unique firms.9 
 
3.2 Variables 
A detailed description of the variables used in our study can be found in the appendix. To 
facilitate comparison over the 20th century, we standardized balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements and transformed all accounting information to modern financial statement structures 
(for detailed descriptions see Westerhuis and De Jong 2015; and Colvin et al. 2015). The most 
significant adjustment relates to the nature of early balance sheets, which were compiled before 
distributing profits. These as well as profit and loss statements are transformed into post-
distribution statements, following the description of profit distribution in Van Oss 
Effectenboek, which yield net income and also affect reserves by adding retained earnings. 
The dividend measure used in the study is dividend payments, an indicator variable 
assigned a value of one for a firm that pays a cash or choice dividend, and zero otherwise. Stock 
dividends are thus excluded. The dividends in a given year are the cash dividends paid out over 
                                            
9 An exception is the market price of shares, as our sample pertains to firms that are exchange listed. For this 
variable we allow missing values and we have also collected 2008 values, in order to estimate effects of dividends 
on future market values. 
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the profits of that year, i.e. we match profits and dividends although the dividends are paid in 
the year after the profits are realized.10 Payout ratio is defined as the amount of cash or choice 
dividend scaled by free cash flow. The latter metric, according to modern standards, is net 
income plus depreciation. We opt for this denominator in order to include the amount of cash 
available for dividend payments. Following standard conventions in the literature, payout ratio 
is capped at one, which value is also assigned when loss-incurring firms pay dividends. 
Because published profits (without transformation) as well as economic profitability (with 
transformation) may have relevance for firms and investors, we include both reported and 
modern profits. 
Firms’ reserve position becomes an important resource when profits are insufficient 
for dividend payments. During the first half of the 20th century, many firms held hidden 
reserves by depreciating assets at a rate that exceeded their decreasing economic value, a 
conservative practice that yielded deflated asset values and underestimation of equity 
reserves.11 Although we cannot measure the actual value of assets, taking recourse to the 
practice of openly setting minimal and unrealistic values, such as one guilder for a factory, we 
construct an indicator variable Conservatism for firms that value at least one asset and less than 
ten guilders.  
Firms with preferred shares can pay dividends to both ordinary and preferred 
shareholders. The probability of dividend payouts tend to be increased by the expectations of 
preferred shareholders and, when applicable, cumulative nature of dividends, we include an 
indicator variable for firms with preferred shares. We also include as a control variable for 
Family firms a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the name of a family is present in 
the firm name or the board includes two or more members from the same family. We 
acknowledge the limitation of this metric in that control of a firm can also be exercised through 
a given family’s ownership of shares. Ownership data for Dutch firms is, however, available 
only from 1992. 
 
3.3 Methods 
Our analyses are formulated to identify reasons to pay, and determinants of levels of, dividends. 
Binomial choice models are employed to understand firms’ decisions to pay a dividend or not 
                                            
10 With respect to interim dividends, we find that they are very rare prior to 1971. When interim dividends are 
apid we allocate these to the total dividends paid in that particular year, as these dividends are paid over the past 
six months. 
11 We define reserves as those components of the firm’s equity that are regular reserves and retained earnings. 
Reserves can be negative when losses are significant, i.e. retained earnings are large negative numbers. 
 13 
 
to pay a dividend, for each of the three periods. .12 13 Our logit model, in reduced form, is: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔௘ 𝜋௜,௧ሺ𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑦ሻ1 െ 𝜋௜,௧ሺ𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑦ሻ ൌ  𝛼௜ ൅  𝛽௡𝑋௜,௧ ൅  𝜀௜,௧ (1) 
where Propensity to pay is the choice variable that indicates whether a firm pays dividends, 
and 𝑋௜,௧ is a vector of explanatory variables. All logit models include corrections for 
unobserved industry-specific and year-specific effects. Although we do not present results on 
the industry and year effects, these are important controls, for example for changes in tax and 
reporting laws that affect all firms alike. We report average marginal effect and standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. OLS regressions are used to explain cross-sectional variation in 
dividend payouts. The dependent variable is the dividend payout ratio. These models are as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜௜,௧ ൌ  𝛼௜ ൅  𝛽௡𝑋௜,௧ ൅ 𝜀௜,௧ (2) 
where Payout ratioi,t is the firm's payout ratio, that is, dividend payment to free cash flow, and 
𝑋௜,௧ is a vector of explanatory variables. All OLS models include corrections for unobserved 
industry and year effects, and standard errors are clustered at firm level.14 We assess the 
relevance of our models across periods by reporting both the AIC information criterion (Akaike 
1974) and (pseudo or adjusted) R-squared statistics.15 
To compare the relevance of specific explanatory variables over three time periods, 
we need to assess the relative explanatory power of the models. To measure the importance of 
dominant practices, we estimate the same model for each of the three periods, and use Shapely 
variance-decomposition algorithms to attribute portions of the models’ explanatory power to 
specific factors. This methodology is commonly used in household finance (see Sastre and 
                                            
12 An alternative approach to find dominant practices is to use switching regression models, where the optimal 
periodization is determined empirically, based on a pre-specified number of switches. In our view, in this approach 
the description of the logics may be biased by ex post rationalization. Therefore, we define our three periods based 
on the description of prevailing practices and institutional developments. 
13 In unreported robustness analysis we also analyse the firm’s decision to initiates or discontinues paying a 
dividend. For modelling this choice we use a binominal choice estimation. The findings are consistent with our 
reported results. 
14 Additionally, we use Tobit regressions, where we jointly model the decision to payout dividends and the exact 
amount of dividends paid. Our results are robust to this alternatives and the results are available upon request. 
15 We also compare the outcomes of the three periods, i.e. the first and second, as well as the second and third. In 
order to do this we also pool the data into two subsamples: we combine 1903-1938 with 1948-1983 and we 
combine 1948-1983 with 1988-2003. We subsequently interact our variables of interest with regime dummies (i.e. 
a variable equal to 1 if an observation is from the period 1948-1983 or 1988-2003). We subsequently test for 
differences between coefficients from the different regimes, which is straightforward for OLS regressions (we 
report p-values). For the logit regressions, due to possible non-linearity, we present average marginal effects and 
test the difference of these marginal effects at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of each variable. For the calculation 
of the appropriate marginal effects we use the delta method, for the test of difference in coefficients we report the 
Chi-squared test statistic. 
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Trannoy 2002; Bourguignon et al. 2005; and, of course, Shapley 1953) and has recently been 
employed in economic history by Colvin et al. (2015). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 and Figure 1 describe the evolution of dividend policies over the period 1903-2003.  
 
 [Please insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here] 
 
The fraction of dividend-paying firms and payout ratio for both the full sample and dividend-
paying firms is shown as well as the percentages of firms that initiate or discontinue dividend 
payments. For 1903, for example, for which we have 82 firm-years, reported return on equity 
was, on average, 5%, which equals the average return on equity after correction to modern 
standards, and free cash flow, on average, 7% of the book value of equity. Thirteen percent of 
firms reported a loss, 56% paid a dividend, and the average payout ratio for the full sample 
(only dividend-paying firms) was, on average, 37% (65%), of free cash flow. In 1908, 14% of 
firms with information for both years initiate, and 2% discontinue, dividend payments, and the 
remaining 84% of the sample make no adjustment to dividend policy. 
Figure 1, which graphically summarizes the evolution of the fraction of dividend-
paying firms and average payout ratio, reveals some striking movement. For example, we see 
upward movement in the percentage of dividend-paying firms (to 74%) until 1918 followed by 
a decline (27%) until 1933 as the effect of the Great Depression is clearly evident in only one 
in four firms paying a dividend, which is evidence of the cyclicality of dividends in the first 
period. Post-war we see a rapid increase (back to 74% in 1948) followed by continued upward 
movement (88%) until 1963. Some variation is observed, but the norm is to pay a dividend. 
Payout ratio is relatively high between 1908 and 1938, ranging from 53% and 66% for 
dividend-paying firms, fairly constant between 1948 (36%) and 1963 (37%), and drops to the 
lowest average payout ratio in the century in 1983 (19%) before resuming modest upward 
movement from 1988 (20%) to 2003 (26%).  
The descriptive statistics are consistent with the predictions of the three regimes we 
have identified. Until the 1940s, with exception of the 1930s economic crisis, dividend-paying 
firms are numerous and pay out most of their profits. With the post-Second World War 
 15 
 
emphasis on smoothing policies, most firms pay dividends. By the late 1980s, dividend paying 
seems almost symbolic, with many firms paying modest dividends. Taxation does not seem to 
influence long term dividend trends. In the years before the Second World War dividend taxes 
gradually increased from 2% to 12% for all shareholders. After the war, higher income tax rates 
applied for private investors, while most corporate shareholders faced no tax disadvantage. 
These tax rates cannot explain the strong reduction in dividends in the 1930s, as well as 
relatively high dividends in the 1950s and 1960s, compared to subsequent decades.  
Table 3 and Figure 2 document the volatility of profitability and dividends over time. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports per period the mean values for payout and profitability measures for 
the five pooled cross-sections. 
 
[Please insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here] 
 
For each firm, we calculate, and present the median of, these standard deviations for the five-
period windows (at least two firm-year observations per cross-section are required to be 
included in this analysis). Lower values imply that firms smooth their dividends and profits. It 
should be noted that these descriptives are an illustration of our arguments. Ideally, smoothing 
is measured using annual data, and our five-year intervals serve as an approximation that has 
to be interpreted with care.  
For the period 1903-1923, using data for 1903, 1908, 1913, 1918, and 1923, we obtain 
an average payout of 8% of equity, a return on equity of 12%, and a free cash flow of 15%, the 
latter two according to modern standards, with median values of standard deviations of 2.00%, 
3.32%, and 4.47%, respectively. Our findings for median volatilities are summarized in Figure 
2, in which we observe median values of the standard deviations of payout, return on equity, 
and free cash flow to have increased until 1938, and values reaching a high towards the end of 
the first period, which corresponds to the turbulent years before the Second World War. 
Increasing volatility in earnings was passed to investors in dividend policies that did not yet 
incorporate smoothing and dividends followed the business cycle. It is interesting to note that 
in the recession of the 1970s and early 1980s we do not witness a similar increase in volatility. 
As mentioned, these results need to be interpreted with care, because we rely on five-year 
intervals.16 
                                            
16 Unfortunately, our data does not permit more accurate estimation of dividend stability as done in Leary and 
Michaely (2012) or Fliers (2019). 
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To show the effects of losses and profits on dividends, Panel B of Table 3 reports, for 
each period, the percentage of firms that pay dividends and payout ratio for different 
profitability groups. We first create profitability groups based on free cash flow values. The 
first group, ‘loss,’ consists of observations that have incurred a loss. The remaining 
observations are assigned to quintiles, with observations grouped according to increasing free 
cash flow values. Because we account for trends in profits by adding observations annually to 
a profitability group, the number of observations is not constant across quintiles. Per period 
average free cash flow, percentage of dividend-paying firms, and payout ratio are reported for 
each profitability group. That payout ratio is set to one for loss firms that pay a dividend 
accounts for the fraction of loss-incurring firms that pay dividends being equal to the payout 
ratio. 
The percentage of dividend-paying firms increases with profitability up to 1938, the 
payout ratio until quintile three, and then decreases. The more profitable a firm, the more likely 
it will pay dividends, which is line with typical statutory arrangements. That payout ratio is 
increasing with profitability can be partially explained by firms’ endeavour to pay promised 
dividend amounts and statutory requirements to add to reserves. Moving through the quintiles 
for the period 1948-1983, we observe an increasing fraction of dividend-paying firms, and 
increase in payout ratio only until the second quintile, with increasing profitability. These 
findings are in line with expectations based on dividend smoothing, where dividends tend to 
be paid by most firms. For the period 1988-2003, we find the percentage of dividend-paying 
firms to be high and payout ratio low independent of profitability group; even 11% of loss-
incurring firms, compared to 2%-3% in earlier periods, pay dividends. Dividend policy is 
clearly largely independent of profitability or profitability levels during this period. In 
summary, the descriptive statistics show that there is merit in subdividing the 20th century into 
separate regimes with respect to dominant practices regarding corporate dividend policy. 
Subsequently studying the determinants of dividend policy will help to reinforce the shifts 
between these regimes. 
 
4.2 Determinants of dividends 
To better understand the determinants of dividend payments, we first undertake a descriptive 
analysis of each of the three periods. Table 4 reports mean and median values for our variables,  
while Table 5 presents results based on comparing the dividend policy determinants for paying 
and non-paying firms; that is, we provide the means and results of t-tests based on the means.  
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 [Please insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that over time the firms have become more profitable, 
levered and larger, while the fraction of family firms has fallen, in particular in the final period. 
Because these characteristics are potentially determinants of dividend policy, it is important to 
control for these differences in multi-variate models. Table 5 reveals that firms that do and do 
not pay dividends differ in many respects, in all three periods. Again, this is a reason to conduct 
multi-variate models and focus the tests of our predictions also on the regression models, rather 
than bi-variate comparisons. Results of multivariate analyses are reported in Table 6. Table 6 
elucidates the question of why firms pay dividends, Panel A reporting regression coefficients 
and p-values per variable and numbers of observations, pseudo R-squared, and AIC 
information criterion per model. Panel B reports the differences between the three subsamples 
and  Panel C reports the results of the Shapely variance-decomposition based on the logit 
regressions in Panel A, showing each variable’s contribution to the model’s overall explanatory 
power. 
 
 [Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 shows the average marginal effects for the determinants of the decision to pay 
dividends across the distribution of each variable.17 For the period 1903-1938, we find the 
decision to pay dividends to be determined, as expected, largely by profitability; that is, we 
estimate a significant positive relation for free cash flow and significant negative effect of 
reported losses, both at the 1% level. In other words, until the 1940s Dutch firms paid dividends 
according to shareholder demands, i.e. when profits were sufficient and refrained from paying 
dividends when losses were incurred. Reserves were not used to pay dividends when profits 
were insufficient. . In line with the notion that cash is needed to pay dividends, we observe a 
significant positive effect for liquidity on the decision to pay dividends (significant at the 1% 
level). These results are consistent with the notion of dividends being determined by statutory 
arrangements. We find that for each additional percentage point of free cash flow to total assets, 
that is, moving from 7% to 8%, the average firm is 120% more likely, a firm that reports a loss 
is 50% less likely than the average firm, to pay a dividend. We control for other variables and 
                                            
17 However, reporting average marginal effects can yield inconsistent conclusions at different points in the 
distribution, which is why in Table 6 Panel C we evaluate the marginal effects at different points of the distribution 
(25th percentile, median and 75th percentile). All our (primary) results are consistent. 
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find that size and net working capital also influence dividend policies.18  
The results of the variance-decomposition, also reported in Panel B, show the free cash 
flow and loss variables contribute two-thirds of the explanatory power of the model during this 
period (24% of the R2 of 36%). Overall, our results for the first period are in line with firms 
meeting shareholders’ demands for dividends as fraction of earnings and relatively high 
payouts, which can be used for consumption and as credible evidence on firm profitability. 
For the period 1948-1983, the two profitability variables are similar in both sign and 
significance level. According to Panel C we find a significantly lower value for the coefficient 
of free cash flow, however, and the added value of this variable is also much lower according 
to the variance-decomposition. Our finding that reserves increase the likelihood that a firm will 
pay a dividend (significant at the 1% level) can be explained by the introduction of smoothing 
to dividend policy, which views reserves of previously retained earnings as an additional source 
of dividend payments. As mentioned before, in this period, dividend policy was referred to as 
reservation policy, in line with shareholders’ changed demands for stable instead of high 
payouts. The change in the coefficient for reserves between the first and second period is 
significant at the 1% level (Panel C). We find that for each additional percentage point of 
reserves relative to firm assets, the average firm is about 60% more likely to pay a dividend. 
Panel B shows the free cash flow, loss, and reserves variables contribute most to the 
explanatory power of the model during this period. For our control variables we find again that 
larger firms pay more dividends.  
From 1988 to 2003, profitability still influences the decision to pay dividends, but now 
through only the negative effect of losses. That firm profitability no longer yields a significant 
effect is striking and consistent with the idea of earnings decoupling. As mentioned before, 
disclosure has improved and the shareholder base of Dutch firms is now comprised of 
(international) institutional investors, with less appetite for dividends. As in the previous 
period, we find reserves to be positively related to the decision to pay dividends (significant at 
the 1% level). The significant (at the 10% level) positive sign for liquidity during this period 
can be explained by free cash flow theory, in which liquidity represents actual cash, that is, 
cash not yet used in a project, with a positive net present value, that should be returned to the 
firm’s shareholders. For the control variables we find that large firms, family firms and firms 
                                            
18 We have no explanation for the negative effect of net working capital, other than that the effect may be 
mechanical, because unpaid dividends are often included in the short term debts. The positive size effect is 
consistent with the international literature (e.g. Fama and French 2001). 
 19 
 
with less leverage are more inclined to pay dividends.19 Panel B shows an increase in the 
contributions of firm size, free cash flow, losses, and reserves to the explanatory power of the 
model during this period. 
We find in Panel B of Table 6 that the determinants of the choice to pay dividends or 
not to pay dividends significantly changed from 1903-1938 to 1948-1983. These changes are 
substantially less significant for the second regime shift. However, this is largely due to the 
fact that in the last period paying a dividend became the norm. This finding is consistent with 
catering towards the new owners, and in particular a confirmation of earnings decoupling in 
the regime shift between 1948-1983 and 1988-2003. 
Although our main goal is to explain why firms pay dividends, Table 7 responds to the 
question of the amounts of dividend payments across the three periods.  
 
 [Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
The variance-decomposition in Panel B shows the largest contribution to the explanatory power 
of the model for payout ratio to be from free cash flow, followed by tangibility. We observe an 
expected negative relationship (significant at the 5% level) between free cash flow and payout 
ratio, because the ratio scales by free cash flow and dividends do not increase proportionally 
to free cash flow. Our finding that leverage decreases payout ratio (significant at the 1% level) 
suggests that commitments to pay increased interest and face value make managers cautious 
about simultaneously increasing payouts. We find tangibility to have a negative relation with 
payout ratio (significant at the 5% level), which reflects a firm’s commitment of more capital 
to financing fixed assets, an important consideration, especially during periods of considerable 
investment. For the 1948-1983 period, Panel B shows the largest contribution to the 
explanatory power of the model for payout ratio to be made by free cash flow, followed by 
tangibility, firm size, and leverage. Liquidity was of little importance during this period. We 
find dividend payout to decrease with firm size (significant at the 5% level, and the difference 
                                            
19 Our finding that family firms are more likely to pay dividends is significant (at the 1% level) for the first time, 
but the relative number of family firms is lower than during the previous two periods, and family members of the 
founder are less likely to be on the board. We thus perceive this dummy as a proxy for ownership by the founding 
family, which is likely to rely on dividends as a form of income, and therefore assume it to function as a corporate 
governance mechanism.  In line with modern finance theory, we interpret our finding of a significant negative 
relation of leverage with the decision to pay dividends to imply that leverage functions as a corporate governance 
mechanism (Easterbrook, 1984). Specifically, there is a substituting effect between leverage and dividends; paying 
dividends reduces the cash over which management has discretion, and thus agency costs. Increased leverage also 
reduces cash (due to increased interest payments and face value) that would otherwise be at the disposal of 
management. This substituting effect should result in a negative sign. 
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between the coefficient of the first and second period is significant at the 1% level), especially 
in the post-war period characterized by heavy investments in rebuilding firms and the economy. 
A significantly negative (at the 5% level) relationship is observed between free cash flow and 
payout ratio. That an increase in reserves reduces the payout ratio leads us to assume an inverse 
causality, that dividends decrease reserves. Our finding that leverage decreases payout ratio 
(significant at the 1% level) suggests, as noted above and not surprising during a period in 
which dividend smoothing was perceived as extremely important, that commitments to pay 
increased interest and face value makes managers cautious about simultaneously increasing 
payouts. We find that tangibility decreases the payout ratio (significant at the 5% level). Firm 
size, leverage, and net working capital were no longer significant, and profitability was no 
longer relevant to explaining payout ratio, in the 1988-2003 period. Our finding that reserves 
increased payout ratio (significant at the 5% level) suggests that firms used reserves to boost 
dividends during this period, and our finding that liquidity increased payout ratio (significant 
at the 5% level) can be explained, as noted above, by free cash flow theory, in which liquidity 
represents cash not yet allocated to a project, with a positive net present value, that should be 
returned to firm shareholders. Tangibility has a significant (at the 5% level) negative relation 
with payout ratio. Increasing tangibility increases long-term capital commitments, but reduces 
information asymmetry about the use of capital and consequently the need for signalling. Panel 
B acknowledges tangibility to be the most important variable in this period and contribute most 
to the model’s explanatory power. So diminished was the importance of free cash flow that 
dividends could be considered to be decoupled from profitability.  
 
4.3 Market price consequences of dividends 
Our analyses thus far have explained how changes in shareholder preferences shape dividend 
policies using a set of variables based on three distinct practices that dominated the 20th century 
Dutch economy. These analyses approach dividend policy from the perspective of corporate 
decision-makers, but dividend policy is also reflected upon by shareholders via the stock 
market valuation of firms (Baker and Wurgler 2004a, 2004b). We measure the relation between 
dividend policy and market valuation using the dividend payment dummy and payout ratio in 
each of the five-year intervals over 1903-2003, and the market-to-book ratio of equity five 
years later, i.e. over 1908-2008. This lead-lag structure ensures that the dividend payments over 
year t, which will be publicly announced in year t+1, can be incorporated in the market 
valuations (measured in year t+5). We obviously lose observations, due to the absence of 
market value information five years after the year over which the dividend was paid. 
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We measure the market value of equity relative to book value. For the period before 
1973, we calculate the firm’s stock price as the average of its highest and lowest quotation in 
a particular year. 20 For the period after 1973, we use the year-end stock price of the firm as 
found in Reach or Datastream. These stock prices are then multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding (obtained from the same source) and divided by the book value of the firm’s equity. 
Although shareholder value creation became a key goal of firms in the 1980s, market valuation 
is a meaningful measure of shareholder perceptions of dividends in the entire 20th century.  
The effect of dividend policy on firm value is investigated in Table 8, which presents 
the five year forward relation between dividend policy and market valuation. Panel A 
investigates the effect of dividend payments, Panel B of payout ratio, for dividend-paying 
firms.  
 
 [Please insert Table 8 here] 
 
For the period 1903-1938, during which dividends were dependent on statutory arrangements 
and firm profits, we find a significant (at the 1% level) positive effect of the decision to pay 
dividends and payout ratio on market-to-book valuation. The economic effects are large, 
showing that paying a dividend corresponds with an increase in value by 25.4% of book equity. 
We argue that Table 8 reports the firm characteristics of the shares that are in relatively high 
demand by investors. That is firms with a higher market valuation relative to their book value 
have seen an increase in demand for their share (i.e. higher price), when they paid a dividend 
during the first regime. More precisely, firms that paid a dividend during this were 
characterized by an increase in demand for their shares (i.e. higher price). Paying dividends 
thus provides information about firm performance, and the fraction of distributed earnings 
increases firm value. This finding is intuitive since any disclosure of financial information 
during this period was fully voluntary. 
Results for the 1948-1983 period are consistent with the notion of smoothing dividends 
and heavy investment after the Second World War by firms with limited access to capital. 
Recalling that financial reporting improved significantly after 1970, we find dividend payments 
to continue to have a significant positive and the payout ratio to now have a significantly 
                                            
20 In the rare cases where the firm’s highest (or lowest) quotation is missing due to low liquidity, we assume the 
remaining quotation is the actual price. We acknowledge that our measurement of the firm’s market values in 
these earlier years is a proxy for the end-of-year prices, which is affected by the use of the high-low averages and 
low liquidity. As a result there is a potential bias in the point estimate and we caution the reader in interpreting 
our results for the market-to-book analysis. 
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smaller, yet still positive, effect on market-to-book. Whether or not dividends are paid thus 
provides information about firm performance. Similarly, dividend amounts become less 
informative about firm value with smoothing, but still have a positive effect on value.  
For the period 1988-2003, we find no significant relation between the decision to 
pay dividends nor the payout ratio and market-to-book. Tables 1 and 2 reported the fraction of 
dividend-paying firms to be high and payout ratio low. This explains the insignificance of 
dividend payments and payout ratio, paying a small dividend having become the norm, but also 
having become a symbolic action with little informational value regarding a firm’s prospects. 
Paradoxically, signalling theory has boosted the number of dividend-paying firms such that 
signalling no longer discriminates the quality of firms.21 
We conclude from the foregoing results that dividend policy has a significant effect 
on firm valuation, and, most importantly, that the results for the different periods are consistent 
with the changing shareholders’ preferences. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We attempt to understand the dividend policies of Dutch firms over the course of the 20th 
century by answering three related questions. Why do firms pay dividends? In what amounts 
do firms pay dividends? What are the value effects of dividend policies? We find the 
determinants of the answers to these questions are by no means be stable over time. 
Our study documents significant changes in dividend policies over the course of the 
20th century, where firms cater towards the demands of shareholders. We identify three distinct 
dividend policy regimes, and each regime is dictated by shareholders preference and an 
economic logic that fits with its day and age. The fraction of dividend-paying firms is volatile 
and payout ratio high in the pre-war years, because shareholders as residual claimants receive 
most of the net profits. In the post-war period, we observe stable dividend policies and 
somewhat diminished dividend payments, where shareholders become more distant to the firms 
and prefer a smooth income stream from their holdings. From the early 1980s onward, dividend 
payments seem to be the norm, the amount of profits distributed much smaller, while 
shareholders become more interested in stock returns and dividend payments become more 
symbolic.  
                                            
21 Our results contradict the findings of Westphal and Zajac (1998), who show that stock markets react favourably 
to symbolic improvements of governance, using US data on managerial incentive plans. It should be noted that 
we measure the longer-term relations between dividend and market value, where signalling theories are better 
tested using short-term market reactions to announcement via event studies. 
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Although our analyses cover a lengthy period, we acknowledge the limitation of relying 
on data from a single country. We nevertheless believe our results contribute to debates about 
long-term developments in dividend polices. We recognise that our findings are perhaps 
difficult to relate to previous historical and contemporary literature because of differences in 
data, time span and methodology. However, our analysis for the most recent period is consistent 
with observations symbolic dividends and earnings decoupling (Zajac and Westphal 2004, 
Brav et al. 2005). More profoundly, our finding strongly relates to the catering effects 
documented by Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b), who show that dividend policies during 
the period 1963-2000 followed shareholders’ appetite for catering based on relative market 
valuations of (non)dividend-paying stocks. This conclusion also yields questions for further 
research. For example, do shareholders of firm managers take the initiative to adjust dividend 
policies? And, which firms are early adopters of the new policies and which firms are late or 
even non-adopters of the changes in dividend policy? These questions can only be answered 
with additional data and analyses using a higher frequency of observations.  
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Appendix: Variable descriptions and definitions 
Variable Unit Definition 
Dividend payments Dummy Dividend payments score 1 if the firm pays a dividend (free cash flow), 
and otherwise 0. 
Payout ratio Ratio Dividends paid to free cash flow 
Return on Equity (modern) Ratio Net profit (modern) to total equity 
Return on Equity (reported) Ratio Net profit (as reported) to total equity 
Free cash flow (modern) Ratio Free cash flow (modern) to total equity 
Reserves  Ratio Equity reserves and reserves from retained earnings to total assets 
Losses Dummy Losses (reported) scores 1 if the firm reports a loss, and otherwise 0. 
Leverage Ratio Total debt to total assets 
Net working capital Ratio Current assets minus current liabilities tot total assets 
Liquidity Ratio Current assets minus inventories to total assets 
Tangibility Ratio Fixed assets to total assets 
Firm size Guilders Total assets (in millions) corrected for inflation (base year 2003) 
Conservatism  Dummy Conservatism scores 1 if the firm depreciates fixed assets to values below 
10 guilders, and otherwise 0. 
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value of equity to book value of equity 
Asset Growth (past 5 years) Ratio 5-year compounded growth rate 
Asset Growth (next 5 years) Ratio Future 5-year compounded growth rate 
Family firm Dummy Family firm scores 1 if the firm has either two or more board members 
from the same family or a family name in the current or former firm 
name, and otherwise 0. 
Board size Continuous Number of board members 
# of interlocks with banks Continuous Number of interlocks with a bank 
# of interlocks with firms Continuous Number of interlocks with another firm 
Preferred shares Dummy Preferred shares score 1 if the firm has preferred shares outstanding, and 
otherwise 0. 
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Figure 1: Dividend payments and payout ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Table 2 for details.  
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Figure 2: Standard deviation of profitability and dividends  
  
See Table 3 for details. 
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Table 1: Dividend regimes 
 
 
Statutory 
formula 
1903-1938 
Smoothing 
1948-1983 
Agency and 
signaling 
1988-2003 
Dividend    
Probability of payout Cyclical High High 
Payout ratio (paying firms) High Medium Low 
Volatility of dividends High Low Low 
    
Determinants to pay dividends: profits    
Loss reported − − − − − 
Level of profitability +  + + 0 
    
Other determinants to pay dividends    
Reserves 0 + + + 
Liquidity + + + 
    
Value effects of dividends    
Paying dividends  + + + + + 
Payout ratio + + 0 0 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dividend policy and profitability measures 
  Profitability Dividend payments (yes or no?) Payout ratio 
Year 
N  
(full 
sample) 
Return on 
Equity 
(modern) 
Return on 
Equity 
(reported) 
Free cash flow 
(modern) 
Losses 
(reported) 
Firms that pay 
dividends 
Firms that start 
paying dividends 
Firms that quit 
paying 
dividends 
Payout ratio for 
dividend payers 
Payout ratio for 
full sample 
1903 82 5% 5% 7% 13% 56% n.a. n.a. 65% 37% 
1908 98 7% 7% 10% 9% 76% 14% 2% 55% 41% 
1913 78 8% 8% 12% 10% 71% 6% 4% 56% 39% 
1918 152 12% 12% 15% 9% 74% 3% 5% 61% 45% 
1923 271 1% -1% 6% 27% 45% 3% 14% 61% 28% 
1928 269 8% 7% 12% 11% 57% 17% 11% 55% 32% 
1933 249 -1% -4% 2% 41% 27% 5% 36% 66% 18% 
1938 259 6% 4% 10% 19% 44% 21% 7% 53% 23% 
1948 258 11% 10% 18% 4% 74% 16% 3% 36% 27% 
1953 303 8% 7% 17% 11% 77% 7% 3% 38% 29% 
1958 234 11% 7% 20% 4% 79% 6% 11% 32% 25% 
1963 271 8% 8% 18% 8% 88% 8% 3% 37% 33% 
1968 233 8% 8% 18% 8% 85% 4% 9% 31% 26% 
1973 168 7% 8% 18% 10% 78% 3% 13% 23% 18% 
1978 137 6% 6% 19% 16% 67% 6% 22% 23% 15% 
1983 108 5% 5% 22% 14% 69% 12% 19% 19% 13% 
1988 112 12% 12% 28% 8% 84% 15% 4% 20% 17% 
1993 105 9% 9% 26% 16% 77% 4% 11% 21% 16% 
1998 140 20% 20% 37% 9% 83% 9% 2% 26% 22% 
2003 111 4% 4% 23% 27% 73% 5% 9% 26% 19% 
Total 3,638 7% 7% 16% 14% 68% 9% 10% 39% 26% 
This table contains descriptive statistics for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year 
intervals. For each cross-section, we report the number of observations and the fraction or mean for all variables mentioned on the top row of the table. For the profitability variables, we mention 
the return on equity (modern), return on equity (reported), free cash flow (modern) and losses (reported). The dividend policy measures are separated for dividend payments and payout ratio. 
Dividend payments consist of 1) firms that pay dividends, which are firms that pay dividends, 2) firms that start paying dividends are firms that did not pay in the previous period but do in this 
period, and 3) firms that quit paying dividends are firms that did paid in the previous period but do not in this period. Payout ratio consists of payout ratio for dividend payers and payout ratio 
for the full sample. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 of the appendix. 
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Table 3: Volatility and distribution of profitability and dividends 
Panel A Averages and standard deviation of profitability and dividends 
Period   Payout ratio/Total equity 
Return on Equity 
(modern) 
Free cash flow 
(modern) 
Payout ratio 
standard 
deviation 
Return on Equity (modern) 
standard deviation 
Free cash flow 
(modern) 
standard 
deviation 
  N mean mean mean p50 p50 p50 
1903-23 212 8% 12% 15% 2.00% 3.32% 4.47% 
1908-28 256 9% 13% 16% 2.24% 4.12% 5.48% 
1913-33 258 9% 14% 16% 2.45% 4.58% 6.16% 
1918-38 320 9% 14% 16% 3.00% 6.24% 7.48% 
1948-68 722 6% 11% 20% 1.41% 3.74% 7.35% 
1953-73 677 6% 10% 21% 1.41% 3.87% 6.56% 
1958-78 560 5% 10% 21% 1.73% 3.32% 5.74% 
1963-83 458 5% 10% 22% 1.41% 3.74% 5.39% 
1968-88 399 5% 11% 24% 1.41% 3.87% 5.66% 
1973-93 318 5% 13% 27% 1.41% 4.12% 5.74% 
1978-98 325 7% 16% 31% 2.24% 6.00% 7.55% 
1983-03 296 7% 17% 34% 2.45% 6.86% 9.11% 
  
  Panel B Profitability, dividend payments and payout ratios for different profit classes 
  
Profit 
class 
1903-1938   1948-1983   1988-2003 
  N 
Free cash 
flow 
(modern) 
Dividend 
paying 
firms 
Payout ratio   N Free cash flow (modern) 
Dividend 
paying 
firms 
Payout 
ratio   N 
Free cash flow 
(modern) 
Dividend 
paying 
firms 
Payout 
ratio 
  Loss 229 -7% 3% 3%   83 -5% 2% 2%   36 -17% 11% 11% 
  Q1 240 2% 26% 18%   276 6% 59% 35%   91 14% 66% 19% 
  Q2 252 6% 51% 36%   330 12% 85% 33%   88 24% 88% 19% 
  Q3 245 9% 74% 47%   346 17% 86% 25%   88 30% 93% 20% 
  Q4 239 15% 76% 39%   346 24% 88% 23%   83 39% 93% 20% 
  Q5 253 26% 73% 33%   331 36% 89% 18%   82 60% 88% 18% 
  Total 1458 9% 51% 30%   1712 18% 78% 25%   468 29% 80% 19% 
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Table 3: Standard deviation and distribution of profitability and dividends (continued) 
This table contains descriptive statistics for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year 
intervals. Panel A reports the number of observations and the mean and the median of the standard deviation for payout and profitability measures per five-period window (each window is a 
pooled cross-section). For these five-period windows, we calculate the standard deviations for each firm and present the median of these standard deviations, i.e. to be included in this analysis 
we require at least two firm-year observations per cross-section. Payout ratio/total equity is defined as (dividends paid to free cash flow) scaled by total equity. Panel B reports for the periods 
1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 1988-2003, per profit class the number of observations, the mean of free cash flow (modern), the fraction of firms that pay dividends (compare to dividend payments) 
and the mean of payout ratio. Profit classes are created based on free cash flow (modern), i.e. 1) the class ‘loss’ consists of observations which have a free cash flow (modern) less than zero, 2) 
the remaining observations with free cash flow (modern) of zero and larger are added to the quintiles ‘Q1’ to ‘Q5’ according to the size of their free cash flow (modern). In order to account for 
trends in profitability, we add observations to a profitability group on a yearly basis, which explains why the number of observations is not constant across quintiles. Note that the payout ratio 
is set to one in case a firm with a loss pays a dividend, which explains that for loss-making firms the fraction of firms that pay dividends equals the payout ratio. Definitions of the variables are 
provided in Table 1 of the appendix. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for different time periods 
 1903-1938   1948-1983   1988-2003 
  (N = 1458)   (N = 1712)   (N = 468) 
Variables mean median   mean median   mean median 
Dividend payments 0.511 1.000   0.784 1.000   0.795 1.000 
Payout ratio 0.298 0.121   0.252 0.211   0.187 0.179 
Return on Equity (modern) 0.049 0.047   0.085 0.082   0.119 0.138 
Return on Equity (reported) 0.036 0.037   0.077 0.074   0.119 0.138 
Free cash flow (modern) 0.088 0.074   0.182 0.174   0.292 0.282 
Losses (reported) 0.203 0.000   0.085 0.000   0.147 0.000 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) 0.023 0.018   0.163 0.149   0.136 0.176 
Liquidity 0.210 0.157   0.343 0.327   0.377 0.338 
Leverage 0.346 0.335   0.451 0.458   0.545 0.547 
Net working capital 0.185 0.123   0.243 0.238   0.156 0.157 
Tangibility 0.403 0.369   0.284 0.252   0.336 0.332 
Firm size (inflation corrected), in millions 110 49   376 80   2298 565 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.352 0.000   0.345 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Market-to-Book 0.846 0.734   0.938 0.809   2.693 1.568 
Asset Growth (past 5 years) 0.065 -0.003   0.633 0.435   0.555 0.361 
Asset Growth (next 5 years) 0.078 0.008   0.582 0.414   0.589 0.382 
Family firm 0.308 0.000   0.304 0.000   0.090 0.000 
Board size 6.915 6.000   7.395 7.000   7.959 8.000 
# of interlocks with banks 1.121 1.000   0.998 1.000   0.900 0.000 
# of interlocks with firms 8.011 5.000   7.477 5.000   4.885 4.000 
Preferred shares 0.046 0.000   0.330 0.000   0.442 0.000 
This table contains descriptive statistics for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-
2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year intervals. For the periods 1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 1988-2003, we report per variable 
the mean and median. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 of the appendix. 
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Table 5: Differences between firms that pay dividends and those that do not pay dividends 
  1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 
  Dividend Payers (N=745) 
Non-dividend 
Payers (N=713)   
Dividend Payers 
(N=1342) 
Non-dividend 
Payers (N=369)   
Dividend Payers 
(N=372) 
Non-dividend 
Payers (N=96) 
Variables mean mean  mean mean  mean mean 
Payout ratio 0.583 0.000   0.321 0.000   0.235 0.000 
Return on Equity (modern) 0.105 -0.009   0.107 0.006   0.172 -0.087 
Return on Equity (reported) 0.113 -0.044   0.102 -0.014   0.172 -0.087 
Free cash flow (modern) 0.141 0.032   0.203 0.107   0.335 0.127 
Losses (reported) 0.007 0.408   0.005 0.374   0.035 0.583 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) 0.057 -0.012   0.190 0.065   0.209 -0.143 
Liquidity 0.242 0.177   0.352 0.310   0.377 0.374 
Leverage 0.360 0.331   0.451 0.450   0.534 0.589 
Net working capital 0.190 0.181   0.251 0.214   0.160 0.143 
Tangibility 0.367 0.439   0.282 0.292   0.341 0.316 
Firm size (inflation corrected), in millions 131 88   384 345   2592 1156 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.334 0.370   0.347 0.339     
Market-to-Book 1.089 0.570   1.001 0.703   2.649 2.860 
Asset Growth (past 5 years) 0.174 -0.047   0.706 0.361   0.603 0.338 
Asset Growth (next 5 years) 0.131 0.014   0.638 0.333   0.631 0.365 
Family firm 0.313 0.303   0.331 0.206   0.102 0.042 
Board size 7.230 6.586   7.600 6.631   8.191 7.063 
# of interlocks with banks 1.195 1.045   1.025 0.892   1.003 0.500 
# of interlocks with firms 8.491 7.509   7.741 6.453   5.347 3.094 
Preferred shares 0.043 0.049   0.337 0.306   0.438 0.458 
This table contains descriptive statistics for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year 
intervals. For the periods 1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 1988-2003, we report per variable the mean for dividend payers and non-payers. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 of 
the appendix. 
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Table 6: Why do firms pay a dividend? 
Panel A Logit regression on dividend payments 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 
Free cash flow (modern) 1.254*** 0.390*** 0.177 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) 
Losses (reported) -0.523*** -0.438*** -0.230*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) 0.231 0.609*** 0.387*** 
  (0.105) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity 0.329*** 0.085 0.177* 
  (0.001) (0.180) (0.081) 
Firm size (log and inflation corrected) 0.033* 0.029*** 0.039*** 
  (0.054) (0.008) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.011 0.044 -0.270* 
  (0.897) (0.420) (0.057) 
Net working capital -0.162** -0.113* -0.212 
  (0.025) (0.072) (0.125) 
Tangibility -0.037 0.015 -0.002 
  (0.434) (0.773) (0.987) 
Conservatism (dummy) -0.026 -0.003   
  (0.327) (0.881)   
Board size 0.048 0.021 -0.019 
  (0.396) (0.603) (0.771) 
# of interlocks with firms -0.019 -0.019 0.011 
  (0.242) (0.124) (0.551) 
# of interlocks with banks 0.003 0.001 -0.008 
  (0.922) (0.969) (0.820) 
Family firm 0.008 0.023 0.200*** 
  (0.780) (0.256) (0.000) 
Preferred shares -0.056 0.015 -0.028 
  (0.354) (0.421) (0.274) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,458 1,711 468 
Pseudo R-squared 36% 38% 55% 
AIC-criterion 1,359.836 1,171.218 259.084 
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Table 6: Why do firms pay a dividend? (continued) 
Panel B Logit variance decomposition on dividend payments 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 
Free cash flow (modern) 10.78% 5.50% 7.13% 
Losses (reported) 12.94% 16.10% 17.23% 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) 2.07% 7.00% 13.30% 
Liquidity 1.32% 0.22% 0.26% 
Firm size (log and inflation corrected) 0.53% 0.75% 3.71% 
Leverage 0.32% 0.31% 1.83% 
Net working capital 0.37% 0.17% 0.57% 
Tangibility 0.21% 0.03% 0.24% 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.28% 0.08% 0.00% 
Board size 0.47% 0.48% 0.88% 
# of interlocks with firms 0.06% 0.11% 1.06% 
# of interlocks with banks 0.04% 0.15% 0.36% 
Family firm 0.02% 0.54% 1.18% 
Preferred shares 0.11% 0.07% 0.25% 
Fixed effects 5.98% 5.99% 6.69% 
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Table 6: Why do firms pay a dividend? (continued) 
Panel C Logit of combined periods and test for difference in coefficients for different percentiles 
    Change [Chi-squared]   Change [Chi-squared] 
Variables 
1948-1983 
(difference) p25 p50 p75 
1988-2003 
(difference) p25 p50 p75 
Free cash flow (modern) -0.539*** -1.049*** -1.381*** -1.426*** -0.142 -0.535* -0.384** -0.045 
  (0.004) [9.576] [19.524] [29.907] (0.481) [2.763] [4.893] [0.175] 
Losses (reported) -0.117 -0.113 0.213 0.488*** 0.112 0.549*** 0.404*** 0.029 
  (0.168) [0.512] [2.442] [15.656] (0.136) [8.858] [17.261] [0.098] 
Reserves (scaled by total 
assets) 0.567*** 0.88*** 0.454* -0.055 -0.076 -0.676* -0.514*** -0.004 
  (0.000) [12.196] [3.764] [0.091] (0.663) [2.823] [10.837] [0.001] 
Liquidity -0.162 -0.309 -0.384** -0.380*** 0.133 0.064 0.013 0.065 
  (0.145) [2.636] [4.855] [8.32] (0.364) [0.067] [0.011] [0.831] 
Firm size (log and inflation 
corrected) 0.009 0.010 -0.011 -0.030 0.034 0.008 -0.003 0.017 
  (0.621) [0.106] [0.156] [1.876] (0.112) [0.036] [0.016] [1.034] 
Leverage 0.063 0.103 0.074 0.030 -0.494** -0.586** -0.326** -0.224 
  (0.494) [0.427] [0.277] [0.083] (0.017) [6.239] [5.375] [1.637] 
Net working capital -0.008 0.011 0.096 0.160 -0.264 -0.182 -0.070 -0.127 
  (0.937) [0.005] [0.5] [2.61] (0.197) [0.671] [0.209] [0.64] 
Tangibility 0.049 0.084 0.076 0.053 -0.140 -0.168 -0.094 -0.063 
  (0.494) [0.494] [0.652] [0.697] (0.372) [0.9] [0.627] [0.486] 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.017 0.031 0.035 0.031         
  (0.604) [0.309] [0.516] [0.761]         
Board size -0.013 -0.028 -0.045 -0.053 -0.049 -0.074 -0.045 -0.021 
  (0.840) [0.064] [0.214] [0.517] (0.603) [0.339] [0.355] [0.247] 
# of interlocks with firms -0.008 -0.010 0.004 0.017 0.032 0.054 0.034 0.014 
  (0.674) [0.1] [0.023] [0.638] (0.265) [1.77] [2.233] [1.255] 
# of interlocks with banks -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.033 -0.037 -0.02 -0.015 
  (0.965) [0.002] [0.005] [0.008] (0.513) [0.309] [0.359] [0.519] 
Family firm 0.022 0.034 0.018 -0.002 0.236*** 0.238* 0.122* 0.109 
  (0.525) [0.336] [0.118] [0.002] (0.001) [2.717] [2.778] [1.801] 
Preferred shares 0.065 0.112 0.105 0.077 -0.054 -0.074 -0.043 -0.024 
  (0.225) [1.409] [1.263] [1.001] (0.185) [1.89] [1.926] [1.128] 
Observations 3,169       2,178       
Year Yes       Yes       
Industry Yes       Yes       
Pseudo R-squared 0.405       0.409       
This table presents the results of the logit regressions for the periods 1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 1988-2003 for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of 
Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year intervals. The explained variable is dividend payments. In Panel A, we report 
per variable the regression coefficient and the p-value and per model the number of observations, the pseudo R-squared and the AIC-information criterion. Panel B 
contains the results of the Shapely variance decomposition based on the logit regressions in Panel A, i.e. it shows the contribution of each variable and the sum of the 
fixed effects to the overall explanatory power of the model. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. In order to avoid biased standard errors, we estimate 
our models by applying a logit regression method with firm clustered standard errors, including industry and year dummies. The intercept is included in the model but 
not reported in the table. P-statistics are included in parentheses. Estimated coefficients marked with ***, ** or * are significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively 
(two-sided). Panel C, shows combined period logit regressions, and depicts the interaction effects between period dummies and the variables of interest. We combine 
1903-1938 with 1948-1983 and we combine 1948-1983 with 1988-2003. We subsequently interact our variables of interest with regime dummies (i.e. a variable equal to 
1 if an observation is from the period 1948-1983 or 1988-2003). We subsequently test the difference between coefficients from the different regimes. We present average 
marginal effects and test the difference of these marginal effects at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of each variable. For the calculation of the appropriate marginal 
effects we use the delta method, for the test of difference in coefficients we report the Chi-squared test statistic. For the OLS-regressions the test for difference in 
coefficients follows a Chi-distribution, we report these test statistics in squared brackets. 
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Table 7: How much dividend do firms pay?  
Panel A OLS-regression on payout ratio     
  (1) (2) (3) Test for difference 
Variables 1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) 
Free-cash flow (modern) -1.180*** -1.063*** -0.022 0.117 1.041*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.718) (0.393) (0.000) 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) -0.175 -0.296*** 0.122** -0.121 0.419*** 
  (0.144) (0.000) (0.023) (0.353) (0.000) 
Liquidity 0.344*** 0.082** 0.143** -0.262*** 0.061 
  (0.000) (0.045) (0.027) (0.007) (0.441) 
Firm size (log and inflation corrected) 0.030** -0.014** -0.005 -0.044*** 0.009 
  (0.042) (0.017) (0.548) (0.005) (0.347) 
Leverage -0.204*** -0.263*** -0.113 -0.059 0.150 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.234) (0.480) (0.169) 
Net working capital -0.374*** -0.317*** -0.058 0.057 0.259** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.513) (0.480) (0.011) 
Tangibility -0.230*** -0.290*** -0.182** -0.059 0.108 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.296) (0.206) 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.003 0.021*   0.018   
  (0.890) (0.050)   (0.410)   
Board size -0.034 0.047** 0.030 0.081* -0.017 
  (0.422) (0.025) (0.416) (0.081) (0.687) 
# of interlocks with firms -0.016 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.003 0.022* 
  (0.263) (0.006) (0.793) (0.825) (0.066) 
# of interlocks with banks 0.008 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
  (0.750) (0.878) (0.872) (0.822) (0.825) 
Family firm (weak) -0.019 -0.008 -0.000 0.011 0.008 
  (0.386) (0.410) (0.997) (0.644) (0.673) 
Preference shares 0.009 0.000 0.007 -0.008 0.007 
  (0.833) (0.978) (0.608) (0.839) (0.686) 
Year Yes Yes Yes     
Industry Yes Yes Yes     
Observations 737 1,336 368     
R-squared 32% 50% 27%     
Adjusted R-squared 29% 50% 22%     
AIC-criterion -128.84 -1,251.37 -537.81     
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Table 7: How much dividend do firms pay? (continued) 
Panel B OLS variance decomposition on payout ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 
Free cash flow (modern) 15.39% 27.41% 0.16% 
Reserves (scaled by total assets) 0.09% 2.09% 2.25% 
Liquidity 1.00% 0.37% 4.06% 
Firm size (log and inflation corrected) 0.46% 4.01% 0.10% 
Leverage 0.71% 3.72% 1.16% 
Net working capital 1.78% 1.92% 1.72% 
Tangibility 5.26% 4.36% 8.29% 
Conservatism (dummy) 0.15% 0.38% 0.00% 
Board size 0.06% 0.54% 0.08% 
# of interlocks with firms 0.06% 0.38% 0.17% 
# of interlocks with banks 0.03% 0.27% 0.14% 
Family firm 0.21% 0.10% 0.01% 
Preferred shares 0.01% 0.47% 0.07% 
Fixed effects 6.69% 4.39% 8.37% 
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions for the periods 1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 1988-2003 for Dutch non-
financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which consists of 20 cross-sections 
of five-year intervals. The explained variable is payout ratio. Where both dividends paid profits should be larger than zero. 
In Panel A, we report per variable the regression coefficient and the p-value and per model the number of observations, the 
R-squared, the adjusted R-squared and the AIC-information criterion. The last two columns high light the statistical 
difference between the period, based on regressions using interaction effects. Panel B contains the results of the Shapely 
variance decomposition based on the OLS regressions in Panel A, i.e. it shows the contribution of each variable and the sum 
of the fixed effects to the overall explanatory power of the model. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
In order to avoid biased standard errors, we estimate our models by applying an OLS regression method with firm clustered 
standard errors, including industry and year dummies. The intercept is included in the model but not reported in the table. P-
statistics are included in parentheses. Estimated coefficients marked with ***, ** or * are significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
level, respectively (two-sided). 
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Table 8: Market price consequences of dividends 
 
Panel A The relation between dividend payments and market to book 
  Full sample     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  Test for difference 
Variables 1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2003 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) 
Propensity to pay 0.254*** 0.087* -0.428 -0.167** -0.515 
  (0.000) (0.088) (0.534) (0.018) (0.454) 
Losses (reported) -0.119** -0.104 -0.829 0.015 -0.725 
  (0.016) (0.196) (0.119) (0.870) (0.168) 
Liquidity 0.048 0.104 -0.779 0.056 -0.883 
  (0.763) (0.495) (0.536) (0.789) (0.472) 
Firm size (inflation corrected), in milions 0.103*** 0.005 0.102 -0.098*** 0.097 
  (0.000) (0.793) (0.372) (0.001) (0.371) 
Leverage -0.009 0.128 0.809 0.137 0.681 
  (0.938) (0.342) (0.357) (0.429) (0.435) 
Tangibility -0.306*** 0.218 -2.413* 0.524*** -2.632** 
  (0.001) (0.129) (0.056) (0.001) (0.034) 
Conservatism (dummy) -0.047 0.053   0.100*   
  (0.287) (0.142)   (0.066)   
Years Yes Yes Yes   
Industry Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 914 1,032 329     
R-squared 40% 26% 17%     
Adjusted R-squared 39% 25% 13%     
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Table 8: Market price consequences of dividends (continued) 
Panel B The relation between payout ratio and market to book (at t+5) 
  Dividend payers     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  Test for difference 
Variables 1903-1938 1948-1983 1988-2008 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) 
Payout ratio 0.384*** 0.236* 0.152 -0.148 -0.085 
  (0.007) (0.076) (0.877) (0.398) (0.929) 
Losses (reported) -0.625*** -0.725*** -0.518 -0.100 0.207 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.132) (0.684) (0.572) 
Liquidity -0.113 0.149 -0.866 0.262 -1.015 
  (0.606) (0.329) (0.563) (0.315) (0.491) 
Firm size (log and inflation corrected) 0.125*** 0.021 0.130 -0.104** 0.110 
  (0.000) (0.371) (0.294) (0.011) (0.348) 
Leverage 0.172 0.214 1.452 0.042 1.238 
  (0.377) (0.141) (0.166) (0.853) (0.233) 
Tangibility -0.249* 0.337** -2.349 0.586*** -2.686* 
  (0.054) (0.033) (0.136) (0.002) (0.083) 
Conservatism (dummy) -0.103 0.061   0.165**  
  (0.128) (0.132)   (0.030)  
Year Yes Yes Yes     
Industry Yes Yes Yes     
Observations 501 850 273     
R-squared 42% 30% 17%     
Adjusted R-squared 39% 28% 12%     
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions and a long-term event study for the periods 1903-1938, 1948-1983 and 
1988-2003 for Dutch non-financial firms listed on the stock exchange of Amsterdam during the period 1903-2003, which 
consists of 20 cross-sections of five-year intervals. The explained variables are market-to-book or changes in market-to-book. 
We summarise the OLS regression results for market-to-book, i.e. we report per variable the regression coefficient and the p-
value, and per model the number of observations, the R-squared, the adjusted R-squared. Definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. The dependent variable is the five-year lead of the firm’s market-to-book ratio. In order to avoid 
biased standard errors, we estimate our models by applying an OLS regression method with firm clustered standard errors, 
including industry and year dummies. The intercept is included in the model but not reported in the table. P-statistics are included 
in parentheses. Estimated coefficients marked with ***, ** or * are significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively (two-
sided). Panel A highlights the effect for the decision to pay dividends and Panel B shows the effect for dividend payers and their 
choice in payout ratio. 
 
 
